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ABSTRACT
Th e paper places the work of G. Gaus into the 
tradition of political thought experimenting. In 
particular, his strategy of modeling moral decision 
by the heuristic device of idealized Members 
of the Public is presented as an iterated thought 
experiment, which stands in marked contrast with 
more traditional devices like the veil of ignorance. 
Th e consequences are drawn, and issues of 
utopianism and realism briefl y discussed. 
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1. Introduction
Our topic in this paper is thought 
experimenting in moral theory and political 
philosophy, with the focus on Gaus’s 
masterwork Th e Order Of Public Reason.1 
We assume a post-Rawlsian framework, 
and ask about Gaus’s methodology, in 
particular about the relative roles of TEs 
and factual knowledge in it. One can speak 
of three kinds of standardly acknowledged 
sources of political philosophical 
theorizing: intuitions elicited in political 
TEs, principles of general ethico-political 
kind, and fi nally, the (presumed) facts 
together with (presumably) true descriptive 
explanatory theories. Plato’s Republic is the 
classic example of philosophical thought 
relying on the fi rst, and somewhat on the 
third source, and Aristotle is his classical 
antagonist, criticizing the reliance on 
dialogical thought-experimenting (under 
other names, of course) and stressing the 
importance of factual anthropological 
and political material and some general 
principles about human sociability and 
1  I wish to thank Professor Gaus for his replies at the 
Rijeka conference, and the organizers and participants for 
the opportunity to discuss thought experiments in politi-
cal philosophy.
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fl ourishing.2 Some very speculative thinkers have opted for the remaining possibility 
of combining principles and intuitions, and relegating facts to a theoretical back-
burner.3 In contemporary philosophy few authors were willing to limit themselves to a 
choice between sources; the mainstream theorizing usually takes into account all three 
kinds of them, varying the order of their importance.4 In his Th eory of justice Rawls 
has been quite explicit about this, linking principles to intuitions, and specifying the 
kind of general facts relevant for theorizing about justice. Th e picture changes a bit 
in Political liberalism; Gaus, in his turn, proposes a further re-distribution of roles 
and weights among the three sources. Political thought experiments are central to the 
methodology of research in political philosophy. Th ey are normally concerned with 
properties of imagined political arrangement, or, more abstractly, of principles guiding 
and structuring them. Two great works of political philosophy, Plato‘s Th e Republic 
and Rawls’s Th eory of justice are arguably long thought experiments, and elements 
of thought-experimenting are omnipresent both in utopian (or anti-utopian) and 
contractualist thinking. (I shall in the following abridge “political thought experiments” 
with “PTEs”, using “TE” alone for “thought experiment”).
Understanding PTEs could, in longer run, improve reasoning in matters of political 
theory. It can also help with particular PTEs in applied matters: evaluating the relevance 
of the Trolley problem, or the weight of the “lifeboat considerations” in ecological 
ethics, and so on, with a series of crucial PTEs. In contemporary ethical and political 
debates the participants constantly appeal to results (and intuitions) that derive from 
counterfactual suppositions and even more complete scenarios typical for TEs. IN order 
to evaluate such proposals, one should have a fi rm grip on methodological assumptions. 
In other words, we are going to explore the methodology of PTEs, because without 
proper knowledge of them, we cannot expect to fi gure out the relevance of the actual 
TEs which are important in themselves and crucial in the moral-political debate. 
In his explicit formulations Gaus is often critical about thought experiments and 
somewhat pessimistic about their reach. He points out that “Rawls increasingly worried 
that as the abstraction is undone and people come to know their comprehensive 
conceptions of value, their devotion to the principles might be “overridden” (§3.2). Full 
knowledge of evaluative standards may change what is validated from the perspectives 
of citizens” (336). He develops Rawls’s reservations further and in new directions. His 
criticism seems to point to the need of facts, and more facts, and in this sense he seems 
to be playing Aristotle to Rawls’s Plato. I want to argue here that this appearance is 
misleading: the new factual knowledge (about social facts, human nature, game theory, 
and so on) leads in his story to new rounds of thought-experimenting. While Plato and 
Rawls have been off ering relatively simple mega-PTEs, piling up the results of micro-
PTEs, each concerning some particular arrangement, Gaus off ers a mega-PTE in 
which we are invited to climb the ladder of refl exivity: fi rst-order PTE, than new facts, 
then second-order PTE, and so on. We are invited to experiment by imagining other, 
2  A separate question concerns the status of religious data in the political thought of Islamic and Christian authors, 
like Al-Farabi, Augustine and Th omas Aquinas. I am inclined to treat most of it as assumed facts, and the rest as prin-
ciples roughly on the same footing with usual moral principles.
3  An example could be Hellenistic neo-Platonists and their medieval followers. 
4  See for instance the work of G. A. Cohen, most recently his (2008) volume.
Nenad Miscevic | A hierarchy of armchairs: Gerald Gaus on political thought experiments
54
somewhat idealized thinkers experimenting in their turn; this is indeed a challenging 
and innovative form of thought-experimenting, not proposed in the extant literature. 
Interestingly, it looks like an original kind of revival of dialogical PTE, absent from 
political philosophical writing for centuries.
Let me then, in the remainder of the Introduction, summarize my view of PTEs in 
general, in order to provide a background for discussing Gaus’s innovative proposal. 
Th en we turn to Gaus; in section II his criticism of Rawlsian abstractionist methodology 
of though-experimenting is presented and briefl y analyzed. Section III is the central 
one of the paper. Th e conclusion raises the question for Professor Gaus: does he agree 
with our understanding of his methodology and how would he himself characterize it? 
Let us now pass to setting out the general framework for the debate.
What is a PTE? Roughly, it is an episode of thinking that involves appeal to imagined, 
counterfactual situation in order to answer a moral-political question. On the most 
general level, features of political TEs are the following:
(a) Th ought-experimental reasoning involves reasoning about a particular set of social 
and political circumstances, which may be specifi ed in more or less detail, 
(b) Th e reasoner’s mode of access to the scenario is via imagination rather than via 
observation. 
(c) Contemplation of the scenario takes place with a specifi c purpose: forming judgment 
about some politically relevant theoretical proposal. (Th is characterization transposes 
to PTEs the general proposal of Tamar Szabó Gendler (2004), who concentrates upon 
TEs in science)
However, more precision is needed. Does any act of imagining count? Th e proposal is 
to distinguish a wide and a narrow conception. On the wide conception, even a small 
imaginative experiments, like those involved in fi nding out a categorical imperative 
concerning some given action (token and type), i.e. imagining everyone performing 
the action, and considering the consequences count as TEs. On the narrow conception 
only systematic, worked-out counterfactual scenarios count as TEs. Th e ambiguity 
is not peculiar to TEs, but rather comes from the very wide application of the term 
“experiment”. Th e Meriam-Webster Dictionary off ers as its fi rst example sentences 
that depicts scientifi c practice, talking about “simple laboratory experiments” and 
“some experiments with magnets”. But then it passes to “an experiment in living more 
frugally” and concludes with “the city’s experiment with a longer school year”. Th ese 
last two are not the province of philosophy of science for sure; and we have no problem 
to distinguish full scientifi c meaning of “experiment” from its less demanding relatives. 
For us the most relevant distinction is one between rudimentary experiments or quasi-
experiments (available even to children) and full-fl edged scientifi c ones. We might 
draw the parallel: rudimentary (quasi-)experiments vs. full-fl edged scientifi c ones on 
the scientifi c side, and rudimentary (quasi-) TEs vs. full-fl edged philosophical ones 
on the scientifi c side. Th e rough-and-ready tests, like for instance Hare’s put-yourself-
in-the-other-person’s-shoes test are rudimentary in this sense. Th e golden-rule test is 
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the most famous rudimentary (quasi-) TE in ethics. Kant’s universalizability test in 
its simplest form is certainly rudimentary, but in the (recent) Kantian literature it has 
been developed into a more complex strategy. Indeed, less sophisticated procedures 
that don’t qualify as full-fl edged TEs also yield intuitions, but this does not entail that 
PTEs are not a useful, we shall later ague even an indispensable tool for the proper 
evaluation of existing political arrangements or institutions. Th e right parallel is 
between the two pairs: rudimentary TEs vs. full-fl edge ones and rudimentary testing 
vs. controlled testing in science. A rudimentary proto-experiment with my marker 
can convince me that it will not leave inerasable traces on the white board, but it is a 
fair cry from controlled testing in the factory, which is itself a fair cry from high-level 
physics experiment in CERN. 
Political TEs conform to a large extent to the pattern of TEs in other domains, like 
theoretical philosophy and science, with one important diff erence: the important 
political TEs are often “macro-thought experiments”, encompassing a lot of smaller 
TEs, testing the justice and other moral properties of particular political arrangements, 
and organizing them into a global political arrangement. (And the similar structure 
is often found in fi ctional utopias, positive and negative, in what offi  cially counts as 
“literary works of fi ction”). Note that the Republic is a dialogical TE, in which debate 
does play a role; typical contemporary TEs are not meant to be dialogical, and it is an 
interesting feature of Gaus’s proposal that it does bring back some of the old dialogical 
format, or at least I shall argue that it does. 
Here is my view of the typical structure of PTEs, micro- and macro (see Miscevic 
2012 for more detail). Usually, at stage one, a question is asked about a particular 
arrangement. For example, in the Republic Socrates asks whether the community of 
children is just, thereby prompting his interlocutor, say Adeimantos, to consider or 
even concretely imagine the scenario. At stage two, the question is understood, one 
hopes correctly, by the interlocutor. At stage three is placed the attempt of the thinker 
actually to imagine the situation to be judged, her tentative conscious production, 
the building of the “model” of the scenario at the conscious level. Th e fourth stage is 
more demanding. It concerns the production of the answer, involving the generation 
of intuition as to whether the arrangement is just or unjust. Th is probably involves 
reasoning at the unconscious level. At the fifth stage, the thinker comes up with explicit 
intuition at the conscious level, usually geared to the particular example and having 
little generality). If the consideration of a particular scenario is typical, the thinker 
will have to do some varying and generalizing (deploying both moral and rational 
competence) at the conscious and reflective level and, perhaps, at the unconscious one 
too. Sometimes this process is called intuitive induction (e.g., “What if the children 
were Spartan or Mycenaean rather than our own? “ Th e arrangement is valid for all”). 
Th is is the sixth stage. 
Stage seven finally brings general belief at the reflective level (“All children in every 
ideally just polis should be common to all citizens”). Th ree components are prominent 
in such a procedure: first, the aggregation of micro-TEs; second, the harmonization of 
the results of these micro-TEs and finally, the judgment of their coherence with other 
moral intuitions one might have. In other words, the philosophical unification can be 
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described in terms of narrow reflective equilibrium. Th is is stage eight. One can call the 
harmonious unification of micro-TEs “the topical narrow reflective equilibrium” and 
the final narrow result “the general narrow reflective equilibrium”. Th e former, topical 
one is geared to the unity of narrative structure, plus the relevance and coherence 
between particular stages, of the micro-TEs. 
Th e attention to the internal structure of TEs is important for the purpose of discussing 
their viability and value, since criticisms of them often result from the failure to 
understand the specifi c requirements and liabilities of each stage. Th is will become 
dramatically obvious in what follows, when we address our main topic.
2. Gaus: the Limits of Abstractive PTEs
We are ready now to consider Gaus’s impressive Order of Public Reason so, (in particular 
chapters V, VI, VII). Th e work is placed squarely in the Rawlsian tradition of public 
reason liberalism and Gaus notes the tension present in Rawls between the veil-of-
ignorance TE and his later stress on public reason, although in other context he speaks 
of “thin and uncertain” line between
A Th eory of Justice and Political Liberalism.(2004, 111) Th e TE has to declare irrelevant 
“much of what a person understands as basic to her evaluative outlook” (42; the pages 
of Th e Order shall be indicated by number in brackets). Th e problem is even more 
general than Gaus notes. Besides the issue of the possible unreliability of one’s political 
imagination, and the irrelevance of distant possibilities which border on the impossible, 
there is the problem of selection. When depicting the scenario to be imagined, one 
has to import various assumptions, in which one is necessarily selective. For instance, 
Rawls was not suffi  ciently explicit about the status of women and the issues of “race” 
and the criticisms this has provoked, which together suggest that he unintentionally 
imported untenable assumptions about the functioning of society into his TE. Each 
great philosopher imports some assumptions or forgets to import others that his critical 
readers fi nd essential.
But then, what justifi es the results? “Rawls increasingly worried that as the abstraction 
is undone and people come to know their comprehensive conceptions of value, their 
devotion to the principles might be “overridden” (§3.2). Full knowledge of evaluative 
standards may change what is validated from the perspectives of citizens“ (Ibid.). 
Rawls saw this stability problem, and so insisted that the abstract justifi cation is 
only pro tanto — full justifi cation must admit the full range of relevant evaluative 
considerations, which might override the abstract justifi cation.” Moreover, Rawls’s 
experiment involving original position is individualistic, not seriously dialogical. He 
tried contextualizing and rooting his PTE: veil of ignorance started as universally valid 
but then Rawls discovers that it is not contextualized it into the existent liberal tradition 
and might be seen as too ad hoc. So, his later liberalism of public reason stresses the 
need of grounding one’s judgments in an independently available tradition. 
Gaus’s proposal is distinctly post-Rawlsian, focused upon the tension between abstract 
TE and the concrete liberal tradition(s). It also addresses another problem, namely the 
role of empirical information. Rawls himself famously provided one possible answer 
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in his demand for wide refl ective equilibrium, meant to bring in information from 
HISTORY, PSYCHOLOGY and SOCIAL SCIENCE. Gaus goes much further in 
specifying the role this information is to play in his socially oriented political and 
moral theory. Consider Gaus’s reconstruction of Rawl’s original TE:
Rawls’ argument from the original position can be understood as a 
formalization of this two-step bracketing procedure. 
First (via the veil of ignorance), we abstract away “private ends” that would 
lead us to legislate. One excludes “knowledge of those contingencies 
which set men apart.” 
Second, we attribute to the parties a concern with primary goods that 
provide a basis for their common deliberation. (37)
Initially, Gaus off ers a Rawls-inspired abstraction-centered PTE, that is meant to 
specify the minimal initial format of the liberal arrangement, namely the famous 
“Rights of the Moderns”. Once this is done, we are invited to go beyond Rawlsian 
thought-experimenting. Let me briefl y summarize the abstraction-centered phase, 
before passing to the second phase.
Here is what Gaus calls the ”Deliberative Model”: he invites us to imagine slightly 
idealized “members of the public” who deliberate about possible rules. We are to 
imagine them deliberating at their armchairs, make them a bit more concrete than, 
say, fully informed and perfectly rational agents, but still better that most of us. Th eir 
task is divided in two parts, the fi rst part being quite close to the Rawlsian project. 
Th e Members of the public should “abstract away from our many disagreements to 
our fundamental common evaluative standards as agents” (390). In this, their views 
and standards will be similar to those available from the single armchair. Th ey will 
come up with rights of agency as basic protections from interference, manipulation, 
and invasion, as well as assurances that certain assistance will be provided or goods 
supplied. Also, some jurisdictional rights, say those concerning private property 
might be found by abstracting “away from this diversity to discover some common 
basis for evaluation of moral rules“ (335). Gaus argues that this much will be stable 
under full justifi cation: once free and equal individuals are aware of their full range of 
relevant values and concerns, they will agree that the basic Rights of the Moderns are 
in their interest. But, very soon, we face the limits of arguments from abstraction. “Th e 
problem then is how to continue on to the justifi cation of more specifi c moral rules. 
At this stage, comprehensive conceptions and the freestanding justifi cation are apt to 
interact in complex ways.” (42)
3. Imagining the Members of the Public
Gaus thus joins those theoreticians that argue that general principles are just too 
general, incapable of dictating their own application. One needs to derive norms and 
rules, and the question is how to do it. We saw that some rules can be derived with 
the help of abstraction. But how does one derive the rest? One demand is clear: we 
need more empirical information. But how do we integrate it with other two kinds 
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of sources, the intuitions and the principles? Some authors eschew the demand for at 
least the fi rst of the two, some, more radical, like for instance Michel Foucault, just 
rest content with historical information and hints for possible conclusions. Gaus is 
far from this kind of minimalism. And he also stresses the need to take into account 
possible deep disagreements that go beyond the minimum guaranteed by abstraction. 
Here is what he proposes
Members of the Public are confronted by a set of socially optimal 
eligible interpretations of an abstract justifi ed right, just as they were 
confronted by a socially optimal eligible set of possible rules, x,y,z. We 
have compelling reason to think that the set would be neither null nor 
a singleton. Th eir justifi catory problem is narrowed (regarding a range 
of issues, only rules that are interpretations of the abstract right are now 
proposed, and they agree on the central importance of having a socially 
eligible set), but there is no reason to suppose it will have an agreed-upon 
optimal element. (370)
Th e Members of the Public then propose specifi c interpretations of these abstract 
rights and rank their proposals as well. Since they are good-willed and rational agents, 
refl ecting on their entire set of concerns and we consider the rules that have been 
accepted by them; those that have been have also passed the test. Now, we philosophers 
ask, sitting in our armchair: how will these members deliberate? Remember that these 
“Members of the Public” are “the rationalized counterparts of real moral agents” (267). 
Th e answer is that each of these imagined Members of the Public, consults then only 
her own evaluative standards and sees that acting on this moral demand is the thing 
that best satisfi es those standards. And a give norm is a rule of social morality only if 
each and every Member of the Public endorses it as binding . We, philosophers, put 
their refl ections together and this of course, brings back intuitions, hopefully, intuitions 
informed by suffi  cient empirical information. We thus have a plurality of imagined 
armchair thinkers, brought to life by one meta-reasoner. Gaus himself in chapter V 
brings in the Kantian metaphor of the Kingdom of Ends (paragraph 15.1 bears the 
title Modeling Legislation In Th e Realm Of Ends) to describe the scenario imagined, thus 
revealing the fact that the degree of idealization proposed is quite dramatic.
It seems that the original PTE is now being iterated: instead of merely questioning 
oneself about the rule(s) to be adopted, the thinker enters a 2-steps procedure. In brief, 
we are dealing here with an extended PTE in the service of Public reason liberalism. 
Th is is then a proper continuation of single-armchair TE. Remember the stages of 
macro-PTEs listed in the Introduction. Suppose we have gone through all of eight 
stages of the initial abstractive PTE: understanding particular questions, imagining 
the scenario, answering (in several steps), generalizing and equilibrating. It seems that 
we now have stages nine to twelve: imagining a group of deliberators being asked a 
question, understanding it, imagining in their turn possible scenarios and then coming 
up with acceptance or rejection of the rule. Perhaps we can describe this procedure as a 
more dialogical one than the typical modern TEs. Th e dialogue is more complex than 
the classical Platonic ones: instead of discussing matters with his interlocutors, the 
thinker imagines characters who deliberate together, and then s/he, the thinker, reaches 
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conclusions from their imagined deliberation.
Gaus goes on to apply game theory to the imagined deliberation and interaction. He 
asks us to suppose that Members of the Public have refused to appeal to Deus ex machina 
philosophical device for solving their problem; instead of this they “stop deliberating 
and, embracing their results (the socially optimal eligible set), they begin to interact 
p 393. In the interaction they” face an impure coordination game” (Ibid); Gaus then 
explains how the game might proceed. Th e game-theoretic knowledge is thus used 
within the imaginary situation; it is being imported into the extended TE, and used 
there to predict the behavior of the imagined Members of the Public. Let me just 
remind the reader that Gaus ends up with an interesting and optimistic conclusion: 
Th ere can be a procedure O, which uniquely selects x from the optimal 
eligible set, and although O is not itself publicly justifi ed, each Member 
of the Public, consulting only her own evaluative standards, has suffi  cient 
reason to act on x. If this is so, then x solves the fundamental problem; 
each adopts rule x as the moral rule to be followed, and each has suffi  cient 
reasons to do so. Th us x’s authority is consistent with the freedom and 
equality of all.  (392) 
In consequence, the type of moral equilibrium sketched is one that respects the moral 
freedom and equality of all. “ Each Member of the Public, when confronted by a moral 
demand consults only her own evaluative standards and sees that acting on this moral 
demand is the thing that best satisfi es those standards. “ (401). Th e whole procedure 
sounds rather armchair-like, a proper continuation of our eight-stage schema. We 
should thus distinguish levels: on the fi rst level, the members of the public have 
empirical information about the particular path-dependent solutions available. On the 
second level, the theorist in her armchair, has the general knowledge that the members 
of the public will have some such solutions available, and she off ers a general, meta-
level scheme of justifi cation for the decisions they might make. Th e whole process is a 
second level TE.
However, this is not the end of the story. Here is a possible objection to the present 
reading of Th e Order of Public Reason. Gaus is keen on actual history, and insists that 
contingent history can be justifi catory; his example is the signing of Magna Carta, 
enabled by the vicissitudes of crusades, but bringing far reaching positive consequences 
in its wake. He notes that “a social equilibrium on a member of the optimal eligible 
set provides the basis for all to conform to a social morality while she still obeys only 
herself ” (418). He goes on to note that this equilibrium is justifi catory. However, “(H)
ow we have arrived at this rule is a combination of contingent history, moral ideas, 
happen-stance, and the exercise of power. Th e route to it is path dependent“ (Ibid.). So, 
the objection goes, it is factual history that might decide, not thought-experimenting.
Answer: we should not forget that the enterprise is a second level TE. Th e path-
dependence is engraved in the mentality of the Members of the Public: since their 
ancestors have signed, say, Magna Carta, they trust Parliament more than they trust the 
Monarch. Th erefore, the theoretician has to count with this preference when she herself 
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is imagining their deliberation. Or, to take a more challenging example: Gaus is sure 
that diff erence principle is a quite utopian rule (444); but this may be due to the fact 
that the last two centuries of American history have been marked by very fast growth 
of social inequalities, that made a prioritarian society unthinkable. Th e Members of 
the Public in a Scandinavian country might have had quite diff erent experiences, and 
this diff erence has to be taken into account when proposing a set of rule to be enacted 
in Iceland.
Th e wider epistemological background of this issue has to do with armchair scrutinizing 
of possibilities (“possible worlds”). Once the actual historical path has been described 
(say, the history of self-management in my country, Croatia, then part of Yugoslavia), 
the moral theoretician should count with preferences and mentalities co-determined 
by this path, and can then, in a fi rst- or second-level armchair scrutinize the moral 
consequences regarding the acceptable systems of rules for my co-nationals. Scrutability 
from factual basis is not unproblematic. Philosophers like Jackson (1997) and Chalmers 
(2012) go all the way: once you can survey (“scrutinize”) the worlds, you also get the 
information about moral value, since all truths are scrutable from base truths.5
We can then say that the decisions of the Members of the Public are empirically 
grounded, but the second level proposals of the theorist are armchair ones, guided 
by general theory of rationality (game theory and the like), and including limited 
information abut actual paths taken by history. So, let me rephrase Gaus’s proposal 
as I see it: what can be done in the simple armchair is to ground the right of the 
moderns after that level, we go more abstract. Th e liberal theoretician justifi es an 
abstract schema of decision making, and he does it considering from his armchair the 
members of the public making their decisions. Th e abstract shema is suffi  cient for a 
general liberal theory; the rest is in the hands of contingent paths taken by history and 
off ering themselves to the Members of the Public. We do stay in PTE, and empirically 
informed, but still situated in philosopher’s armchair.
Before passing to the conclusion, let me note a problem for the model, returning 
to the example of diff erence principle. In Chapter 7, § 21.4 entitled “Th e Dangers 
of Utopianism” Gaus warns the reader from making to idealistic demands on public 
reason. 
Th e utopian aspiration also itself leads to injustice. We deeply disagree 
5  The idea of scrutinizing possible scenarios is developed in great detail In Chalmers (2012) on almost 500 pages, and 
the issue of getting to the moral matters from physical-plus-mental matters is raised. Chalmers asks: are moral truths 
scrutable from non-moral truths? And if they are, he claims, then moral truths will not pose a distinctive problem for 
scrutability. Here is the gist of his answer.
On the face of it, there are good grounds to hold that insofar as there are moral truths and they are 
knowable, then they are scrutable from non-moral truths. Certainly, given that moral truths are know-
able at all, they appear to be empirically scrutable and conditionally scrutable: given full enough knowl-
edge of the non-moral properties of a situation, we are in a position to know its moral properties. …
Moral truths will be inscrutable from non-moral truths only if some crucial principles or conditionals 
governing inferences from non-moral truths to moral truths are unknowable, or if any inference from 
non-moral truths to moral truths has an irreducibly empirical justifi cation. But there is little reason to 
believe in unknowable moral principles here, and there is little reason to believe in such an irreducibly 
empirical justifi cation. (2012, 264) 
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about ideal justice. Rawls and his followers have painted a portrait of the 
fully just society, but it is not the picture of all free and equal persons. 
For Rawlsians to insist, in the face of the intense and sophisticated 
disputes about the nature of distributive justice, that all free and equal 
persons endorse this specifi c vision as their own ideal simply cannot be 
accepted as credible. Free and equal persons disagree about ideal moral 
arrangements. (445)
Th e fi rst sentence sounds reasonable and familiar from a long tradition, fi guring authors 
like Popper and Berlin. But the reader might be surprised that diff erence principle 
would be such a dangerous utopian principle potentially leading to serious injustices. 
Th e fact that many rich and moderately rich people would not agree to limiting the 
growth of their richness to the fate of the worse off  members of their society might be 
taken in two ways: either, as Gaus takes it, as an objection to diff erence principle, or, as 
a more leftist theoretician might see it, as making these people ineligible as they are, to 
the role of a Member of the Public. Indeed, the Members are a bit idealized: why not 
take idealization to involve curtailing some of the natural egoism?
Let me generalize a bit. Imagine interviewing intelligent, well educated and well-
meaning ancient Athenians about the institution of slavery. Judging from Aristotle and 
the dramatic writers, most of your interlocutors would stick to treating it as just, and 
fi nding some way or other to justify it. Most of them would propose that slaves should 
be treated better than they were actually treated, perhaps much better. But abolition 
would certainly be out. Conclusion: society without slavery would be a dangerous 
utopia, beyond the reach of Athenian Members of the Public. Doesn’t sound just. Gaus 
could retort that slavery is already out at the stage considered thanks to the abstraction 
strategy and the list of basic human rights constructed with its help at the previous 
stage. But if we can proceed so decisively and brusquely when it comes to slavery, 
why not in the case of dramatic inequality? Alternatively, Gaus could propose a more 
general schema of distributional equality, that might get the votes of the preferred 
committee of Members of the Public, and this would be a proposal that I would gladly 
welcome. Otherwise we would face a serious problem: any systematic arrangement 
that seems just to us philosophers, but cannot be expected to be accepted by many of 
our less theoretically interested compatriots would appear as dangerously utopian. And 
every concrete arrangement that does not have full blessing of all our colleagues would 
be equally dangerously utopian. Question to Professor Gaus: what should be done?
Let me now return to the big picture. 
4. Conclusion and Final Questions
Th ere are two major and confl icting methodological options concerning political TEs. 
Th e fi rst, in favor of the armchair, claims that they are essential given the complexity 
of social life, and that imagining relatively distant possibilities teaches us about what 
is morally required, by separating in imagination the morally relevant from irrelevant 
aspects that cannot be so clearly separated in empirical research bogged down in actual 
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contingent details of historically given political arrangements.6 Th e opposite view points 
to serious problems with TEs, and suggest that we don’t use them, or at least that we 
don’t put much justifi catory weight on them. Some passages of Order of Public Reason 
are quite critical of the Rawlsian thought-experimenting. However, we have argued 
that Gaus in fact proposes a novel scheme for PTEs, namely building a two stage 
model in which the theoretician refl ects about the imagined refl ection of her Members 
of the Public. Empirical information (ranging from history to more speculative matters 
like decision theory and game-theory) is integrated into the assumptions about the 
Members of the Public, but the ultimate verdict is in the domain of the armchair. 
If successful this methodology could mediate between the more abstract thought-
experimental proposals and the more tradition-based ideas of public reason liberalism, 
as well as between the armchair and the empirical scientifi c evidence. 
My main question for professor Gaus is therefore the following: do you agree with 
this diagnosis about your methodology, and do you see the methodology as the second-level 
armchair refl ection? In his immediate reaction at the conference, Professor Gaus’s 
kindly answered to this question pointing to diff erent perspectives governing political 
refl ection, quite along the lines of the conclusion of Chapter V of his Order of Public 
Reason.. On the one hand there is “you and me and our morality”; being philosophers 
we construct a model of an agent, I presume idealized, and then go on experimenting 
with the model. On the other hand, there is the need to consider the perspectives of 
the actual people in society, and for this we have to look at actual society. Of course, 
this is not the end of the story, since in the book Gaus does integrate the information 
about actual society into the imagined model prominently fi guring the Members of 
the Public. So, let me ask the question now in a written form, hoping for a positive 
answer.
I see Gaus’s reiteration of thought-experimenting on 2nd level as pointing to the 
indispensability of PTEs: a TE is an original and irreplaceable “representational device”, 
which does not reduce to mere illustration of some piece of abstract knowledge or theory. 
My own preferences are of course in favor of political TEs. In science the armchair 
plays a crucial role (controlled by other devices, from microscopes to telescopes), so 
why not in political philosophy?. Given their ubiquity in the history and present scene 
moral philosophy probably could not exist without TEs. Th e critic may respond that, 
it doesn’t follow from the fact that some tool has been used frequently for some task 
in the past, that it is the most effi  cient tool, let alone indispensable, for that job. Even 
granted the proposed claim that there is only one real alternative to PTEs (i.e. arguing 
6  How can imagination, deployed in successful PTEs open the door to the realm of normative truths? Or even imagi-
nation plus desire? Th e view to be defended is that in good case the intuition does track some objective moral quality of 
the target arrangement or action; the preferred view about objectivity is that it involves appeal to how idealized observer 
would react to the target item. Take the goodness-as-experienced, goodness. Such goodness is being intentionally expe-
rienced as being a property of an action, or state of aff airs. (A transparency datum). I would briefl y argue as follows:
Th e experiencing, in the case of imagined scenarios, is an act of moral intuition. 
But experienced goodness of a political arrangement is not an experiencer-independent property of action, or state of 
aff airs. (From science)
Goodness is not a property of subjective state (From Transparency). 
Th erefore (by principles of charity and by inference to the best explanation),
Being good in objective sense is being such as to cause the response of experiencing goodness in normal observers under 
normal circumstances. 
Since goodness and value in general is thus response-dependent, we can come to know about it from the armchair. (see 
also Gaus, (1990), in particular the section “Color analogy”).
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from general principles and the relevant empirical data), the PTE tradition would 
have to be able to show better results than its rival tradition. But what are the relevant 
criteria here and would the comparison come out in favor of the PTE-tradition? But 
what about the worries? Well, the controlling devices are available here as well, and 
they enter the wide refl ective equilibrium; Gaus’s two-stage proposal might off er us 
some more, and thus further confi rm the reliability of the well-balanced politics from 
the armchair.
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